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The importance of managing ground and surface water conjunctively increases 
with water scarcity and with inter- and intra-temporal fluctuations in precipitations.  Both 
factors are becoming critical in many parts of the world: the former due to increased 
water demand associated with economic and population growth; the latter due to climate 
change.  A conjunctive ground and surface water system appears in a number of forms, 
which differ according to the ground and surface water sources. Surface water may 
consist of stream flows emanating from aquifers, surface reservoirs or lakes, snowmelt, 
rainfall or any combination of these.  It may be stable or stochastically fluctuate over 
time.  Groundwater sources – aquifers – may be non-replenishable or replenishable, deep 
or shallow, confined or unconfined.  The two cases in which only surface water or only 
groundwater is used lie on both ends of the conjunctive spectrum; these extreme cases 
occur when one source is always cheaper than the other (scarcity cost included).  
Conjunctive systems, viewed in this larger context, characterize most irrigation systems 
worldwide.  The term conjunctive signifies that the ground and surface water sources are 
two components of one system and should be managed as such.   
The analysis of conjunctive water systems was pioneered by Oscar Burt more 
than 40 years ago.  More recently, Tsur, Tsur and Graham-Tomasi, Provencher and Burt, 
and Knapp and Olson extended the theory to account for stochastic, dynamic and 
multiaquifer considerations.  The underlying idea is simple.  Surface water sources 
derived from rainfall and snowmelt typically fluctuate randomly from year to year and 
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2 Yacov Tsur is a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. within a year.  Groundwater stocks, on the other hand, are relatively stable because the 
slow subsurface flows tend to smooth out intra- and inter-temporal fluctuations.  
Groundwater thus performs a dual function, increasing the mean and reducing the 
variability of total water supply.  The value of groundwater is usually attributed to its first 
– mean increasing – role, while its variability reducing role is ignored.  Yet the latter role 
carries an economic value, which is designated as the stabilization value (or buffer values 
in the dynamic context) of groundwater, which could be substantial.   
Why should we be interested in the stabilization value as a distinct concept?  
Suppose that a groundwater development project can be implemented at some cost and 
the decision whether or not to undertake the project is based on a cost-benefit criterion.  
Clearly, determining the benefit generated by the groundwater project assuming that 
surface water is stable at the mean, while easier to obtain, ignores the stochastic 
fluctuations of surface water and the ensuing stabilization role of groundwater.  If the 
economic value associated with this role – the stabilization value – is non-negligible, 
compared to the value of the resource due to increasing the mean water supply, this 
simpler approach leads to a serious underestimation of the groundwater benefit and bias 
assessment of the groundwater projects.  Empirical studies (Tsur) reveal substantial 
stabilization value of groundwater.   
Here we discuss implications of the stabilizing role of ground water for 
conjunctive ground and surface water policies.  Applying the analysis to Coimbatore 
Water District in Tmil Nadu, India reveals a substantial stabilization value.  We conclude 
with some remarks regarding the important role of conjunctive water management 
policies in a world of increasing food demands and declining irrigation water supplies.  
  2The stabilization value of groundwater revisited 
  Suppose that crop production requires only water and let f(x) be the per-hectare 
yield-water response function, with x representing water input (the empirical application 
employs an extended version with multiples outputs and inputs).  The water response 
function f(x) is assumed increasing and strictly concave over the appropriate range of 
water input, reflecting the diminishing marginal productivity property.  Let R(x) = pf(x) 
represent revenue per hectare when output price is p (assumed exogenous to farmers).  
Following the properties of the yield-water response function, f(x), the revenue function, 
R(x), is increasing and strictly concave in water input.    
Let S represent available surface water supply (e.g., annual rainfall), assumed to 
fluctuate randomly according to some probability distribution function F(S).  (We ignore 
intra-seasonal variations of surface water and consider only variations in total supply of 
surface water during a year.)  When surface water (rainfall, stream flows emanating from 
snow melt) is the only source of irrigation water, the revenue (which is also profit in this 
case) R(S) also fluctuates randomly around its mean Rm=E{R(S)}, where E represents 
expectation with respect to the distribution of S.  If rainfall could be stabilized at the 
mean Sm=E{S}, the revenue would have changed to R(Sm).  Since R(⋅) is strictly concave, 
we have (Jensen's inequality)  
E{R(S)} < R(Sm) .          ( 1 )  
Let Sce be the Certainty-Equivalent water input satisfying  
E{R(S)} = R(Sce) ,            ( 2 )  
i.e., Sce is the constant annual surface water that leaves farmers indifferent between 
receiving it with certainty (every year) and facing the uncertain rainfall S with 
distribution F(S).  Since R(⋅) is increasing, (1) and (2) imply Sce<Sm.  (Growers are 
  3assumed to be risk neutral and the divergence between Sce and Sm stems from the 
concavity of the revenue function.)   
  How much farmers are willing to pay in order to stabilize surface water supplies 
at the mean (Sm) rather than facing the (actual) uncertain supplies S?  The answer is 
simply the difference in revenues between the two situations:  R(Sm) – E{R(S)}.  We call 
this the Stabilization Value (SV) and, using (2), express it as 
SV ≡ R(Sm) – E{R(S)} = R(Sm) − R(Sce).       (3) 
In Figure 1, SV is given by the area HCSmSce.  
To gain insight on how SV depends on the distribution of rainfall, we take a 
second order Taylor expansion of R(S) around R(Sm) and approximate E{R(S)} by   
E{R(S)} ≅ R(Sm) + 0.5R"(Sm)σ
2        
where σ
2=E{(S−Sm)
2} is the variance of S.  By combining (3) and the above equation, we 
obtain 
SV ≅ -0.5R"(Sm)σ
2.            ( 4 )  
We see from (4) that SV increases wit σ
2 (the variance of rainfall) and with -R"(Sm) = the 
steepness of the marginal revenue function (the derived demand for water) evaluated at 
Sm (the average surface water supply). Thus SV increases with rainfall variability (σ
2) and 
with the steepness of the derived demand for water at the mean rainfall Sm.  Typically the 
derived demand for water is convex (i.e., the 3
rd derivative of R(⋅) is positive – see the 
examples in Tsur et al. and the application below).  In such cases the magnitude of R"(Sm) 
decreases with Sm, so that SV increases with the variance (σ
2) and decreases with the 
mean (Sm) of surface water supplies.  We note that the purpose of approximation (4) is to 
shed light on how SV depends on the distribution of surface water (particularly its mean 
and variance) but not for evaluation.   
  4  Suppose now that water from a groundwater source becomes available for 
irrigation at a constant unit cost z ($ m
−3) and assume further that the rainfall distribution 
and z are such that some groundwater will be demanded also during rainy years, i.e., 
R'(Smax) > z, where Smax is maximal surface water supply (or the upper support of the 
distribution of S).  We consider the situation in which groundwater pumping decisions 
are made after the rainfall realization is observed.  (Tsur analyzed the stabilization value 
under this assumption.  Tsur and Graham-Tomasi called it 'ex post' and considered also 
the case in which groundwater pumping decisions are made before the realization of S is 
observed, which they refer to as the 'ex ante'.)  In this case, profit-seeking farmers 
demand the constant (stabilized) water input x(z) satisfying R'(x(z)) = z by augmenting the 
rainfall realization S with the amount of groundwater g = x(z)−S (see Figure 1).   
The introduction of groundwater has, in effect, lead to a stabilized water supply.  
We can imagine it occurring in two steps: first, surface water is stabilized at the mean Sm; 
second the surface water supply is augmented by the amount gm=x(z)−Sm of groundwater.  
The economic value associated with the first (stabilizing) step is the Stabilization Value 
of groundwater and is given by SV of equation (3).  The economic value associated with 
the second step is the value due to the increase in the mean water supply from Sm to x(z) 
and is denoted the Augmentation Value (AV) of groundwater: 
AV = [R(x(z)) – R(Sm)] – z[x(z) – Sm]       (5) 
The total value of groundwater is the sum SV+AV.  Notice that the price of groundwater z 
affects AV but not SV. 
In Figure 1, the total revenue is the area AExzO and the average groundwater cost 
is E{z⋅(x(z)-S)}=z⋅(x(z)-Sm) = area GEx(z)Sm.  The average profit is thus the area 
AEGSmO.  The total value of groundwater is the area HEGSmSce, of which SV = area 
HCSmSce and AV = area CEG.  In general, Sce decreases with the variability of rainfall, as 
  5can be seen from (2) and (4).  Thus, a mean-preserving spread of the rainfall distribution, 
which increases variance while keeping the mean intact, will increase the SV of 
groundwater and vice-versa.  
Figure 1 here 
In actual practice multiple crops and multiple inputs exist and the derived demand 
for irrigation water is modified accordingly.  The SV of groundwater is then calculated as 
explained above, using the aggregate derived demand for water.  The framework can be 
extended to multiple water storage sources, such as multiple aquifers with varying 
pumping costs and surface reservoirs.  Moreover, some of the water storage sources may 
also be stochastic.  As long as they are not perfectly correlated with rainfall they are 
capable of affecting the variability of water supply in a way that gives rise to a 
stabilization value.  
Ignoring the rainfall variability, by assuming that rainfall is stable at the mean, 
amounts to assuming that SV=0, which does away with the stabilizing role of 
groundwater.  This may lead to severe undervaluation of groundwater and distort water 
management policies.  Some policy implications are discussed in the next section, 
followed by an empirical assessment of the stabilization value of groundwater in the 
Coimbatore water district of Tamil Nadu, India.   
Conjunctive management 
  The stabilization value of groundwater affects water policies in a number of ways.  
First it affects the optimal extraction decisions of a dynamic exploitation policy.  To see 
this, consider the above conjunctive ground and surface water system over a long period 
of time.  Denote the aquifer's stock at time t by Gt, which evolve in time according to  
dGt/dt = M(Gt) – gt,          ( 6 )  
  6where M(G) is natural recharge, assumed non-increasing and concave in the aquifer's 
stock G, and time is taken to be continuous.  The aquifer management problem entails 
finding the pumping policy {gt, t≥0} that maximizes the value  
∫
∞
− − + =
0
rt
t t t t t } {g 0 dt e ] g ) z(G )} g {R(S [E max ) V(G
t       ( 7 )    
subject to (6), given initial stock G0 and feasibility constraints (gt≥0, Gt≥0), where r is the 
time rate of discount and pumping cost z(G) may depend on the aquifer's stock.  The 
expectation Et is conditional on the realization of St being observed before the pumping 
decision gt is made – a situation called 'ex-post' by Tsur and Graham-Tomasi .   
A detailed analysis of this model can be found in Tsur and Graham-Tomasi 
(1991).  Here we just note the condition  
R'(St+gt) = z(Gt) + V′(Gt)   ,         ( 8 )  
determining the optimal pumping decision at time t, where V′(Gt) is the incremental 
value due to marginal chance in the groundwater stock Gt or the shadow price of 
groundwater (also known as user cost, in-situ value and scarcity value).  (The expectation 
is ignored because the realization St is assumed to be observed when gt is chosen.)   
If, however, surface water is assumed stabilized at the mean, the management 
problem changes to  
∫
∞
− − + =
0
rt
t t t m } {g 0
m dt ]e )g z(G ) g [R(S max ) (G V
t      (9) 
subject to (6) and feasibility (e.g., nonnegativity) constraints and the optimal pumping 
rule (8) becomes  
R'(Sm+gt) = z(Gt) + V
 m′(Gt) ,         ( 1 0 )  
Where V
 m′(Gt) is the groundwater shadow price when St is fixed at the mean Sm.   
Tsur and Graham-Tomasi showed (under certain conditions) that  
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 ′(Gt) > V
 m′(Gt) .          ( 1 1 )  
The shadow price of groundwater under stochastic surface water supplies is larger 
because of the added role of groundwater in stabilizing water supply and the ensuing 
economic value that goes with it.  Thus, at any given groundwater stock G, water users 
should pay more for the resource, hence pump less, under stochastic rainfall relative to a 
stabilized situation.   
The Stabilization Value can also have a considerable effect on cost-benefit 
analyses of groundwater projects.  Quite often the mere access to an aquifer requires 
investment in infrastructure, besides the operational costs associated with water pumping 
and conveyance.  This cost should be compared to the benefit associated with developing 
the aquifer.  Ignoring the stabilization value leads to underestimating the benefit 
associated with the development project.  To see this consider the case where extraction 
cost z is independent of the stock and the aquifer stock is at a steady state, i.e., average 
extraction just equals recharge: E{g(S)}=M(G).  In this case the shadow price of 
groundwater vanishes at a steady state (see Tsur and Graham-Tomasi) and Condition (8) 
implies that S+g(S)=Sm+M(G).  The value V(G) evaluated at a steady state is thus given 
by  
r




G zM G M S R
dt e G zM G M S R dt e S zg S g S R E G V




) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( (


















dt e S R E V
rt S ∫
∞
− = =  
Thus, the benefit associated with developing the aquifer is  
  .
) ( ) ( )) ( ( )} ( { ) (
) (
r
G zM S R G M S R
r
S R E S R
V G V
m m m S − − +
+
−
= −  
  8The first term on the right-hand side is the present value of the Stabilization Value of 
ground water.  The second term is the present value of the Augmentation Value of 
groundwater.  Assuming stable surface water supplies is equivalent to assuming that SV 
equals zero, hence biases downward the project's benefit.  The magnitude of the bias 
depends on the magnitude of SV.  In 2 applications, the SV as a share of the total value of 
groundwater was found to be substantial (Tsur).  We turn now to calculate the 
stabilization value of groundwater in the Coimbatore water district, located in Tamil 
Nadu, India.  
Application 
Data:  Irrigation water is derived from surface reservoirs, filled by the monsoon rains and 
distributed via a system of canals, and from local aquifers. During the 2001-2002 
agricultural year (that extends from July to June) 52.5% of the irrigation water came from 
surface sources, 45.2% from local wells (groundwater) and the remaining 2.3% from 
other sources (Palanisami).   
  There are two monsoon periods: the Southwest monsoon from June to September; 
and the Northeast monsoon from October to December.  The period between January and 
May is dry, but surface reservoirs allow distributing water throughout the year.  The 
annual rainfall, thus, constitutes the available surface water supplies. Figure 2 shows 
annual rainfall data (mm) for the periods 1965-1985 and 1991-1999.    
Figure 2 here 
  Due to rising water demands by non-agricultural users, the reservoirs now satisfy 
about 90% of the irrigated area in normal year and only 60% during dry (low rainfall) 
years.  These shares are expected to worsen (decline) in the future, as urban, industrial 
and environmental water demands rise.  Thus, surface water supplies available for 
  9irrigation will on average decline and become more variable (larger variance) in the 
future (both trends increase the stabilization value of groundwater).  
Crop pattern: Table 1 presents the main crops grown in Coimbatore District with their 
cultivated area, water requirement (m
3 ha
-1), yield (100kg ha
-1) and price (Rs per 100kg) 
during the 2001-2002 agricultural year ($1=48.5 Rs in 2002). The main crops (in terms of 
area) are ground nuts, paddy rice and sugar cane.  The cultivation of ground nuts is done 
during the dry season, while paddy is grown during the monsoon seasons. The only 
perennial crop is Tapioca (most banana and sugar cane areas are replanted every year in 
Coimbatore District).  The most water intensive crops are sugar cane and banana 
followed by paddy rice.  
Table 1 here 
Production inputs and cost:  Table 2 lists the input requirements per hectare (other 
than water) and their costs (Rs ha
-1) for the 13 crops listed in Table 1 (since water is 
assumed the binding constraint and not land, the cost of land is virtually nil).  The 
rightmost column of Table 2 gives the per hectare production cost, excluding water.  
We turn now to calculate the stabilization value of groundwater in Coimbatore 
Water District.  
Table 2 here 
The Stabilization Value: The first step is to obtain the derived demand for irrigation 
water.  The aggregate data presented above do not permit detailed analysis and we follow 
the approach used in Tsur et al., which utilizes Howitt's PMP method.  Table 1 contains 
data on crop area allocation, yield water requirements and output prices for the 13 crops 
grown in Coimbatore district.  Table 2 contains per hectare input requirements of all 
production inputs other than water and their cost for these 13 crops.  The rightmost 
column summarizes the per hectare production cost, excluding water. .  The data are then 
processed by the PMP method to yield the derived demand for irrigation depicted in 
Figure 3.  
  10 
Figure 3 here 
  The rainfall data St, depicted in Figure 2, are measured in mm.  The 
corresponding surface water supplies are obtained by multiplying St by 10 times the 
irrigated area (77543 ha).
3  The rainfall distribution is taken as the empirical distribution 
of the observed sample, where each observation receives an equal weight of 1/30 (30 
being the number of observations).   
For any water supply x, the revenue R(x) is calculated as the area beneath the 
derived demand curve (Figure 3) to the left of x.  In this way the revenues R(St), 
t=1,2,…,30, are calculated for each observation (sampled year).  The sample average 
rainfall is Sm=ΣtSt/30 and R(Sm) is calculated as the area beneath the derived demand 
curve to the left of Sm.  Noting equation (3), obtaining SV requires the expected revenue 
E{R(S)}, which we estimate by the sample mean ΣtR(St)/30.  The Stabilization Value 
(SV) is then estimated by   






t m S R S R SV
Calculating the Augmentation Value (AV) requires the cost of groundwater (cf. 
equation (5)), which consists of the pumping and conveyance cost z(G) plus the user cost 
(or in-situ value) λ (see equation (8)).  Obtaining these costs requires solving the dynamic 
optimization problem (7).  This task requires elaborate hydrological and engineering 
(pumping, conveyance) data and is beyond the present scope.  To gain insight on the 
share of SV in the total value of groundwater we calculate  
A = R(∞) – R(Sm), 
                                                           
3 One mm rainfall over one hectare is equivalent to 10 m
3. 
  11which the AV when the cost of groundwater is zero.  Thus, A > AV and 
SV/(SV+AV) > SV/(SV+A).  The share SV/(SV+A) is thus a lower bound on the share of 
SV in the total value of groundwater.    
The empirical results are presented in Table 3.  Economic values are measured in 
Rupees. We see that the stabilization value accounts for more than 25% of the total value 
of groundwater.  Ignoring it, by assuming stable rainfall, would have led to 
underestimation of the value of groundwater by more than 25%.   
Table 3 here 
Concluding comments 
  Population growth and rising living standards lead to rapid increase in the 
demand for water.  Since the average quantity of renewable fresh water available for 
use in any particular location is constant and water conveyance is an expensive 
operation, water has become a scarce resource in many parts of the world.  Adding the 
prevalence of deteriorating water quality and the increased awareness for water-
related environmental and social problems helps to understand why water resource 
management has become a critical policy challenge.  In the region studied here, 
surface water has been relocated away from irrigation to meet the growing demands 
of other sectors in a way that reduces the average quantity of surface water available 
for irrigation and at the same time increases its variability (the withdrawal for non-
agricultural uses is larger during dry years than during wet years).  
Worldwide irrigation water still consumes the bulk of the available renewable 
fresh water resources (over 70 percent).  While irrigated agriculture is practiced on only 
about 18 percent of total cultivable land (267 million hectare in 1997, of which 75 
percent are in developing countries), it produces over 40 percent of agricultural output 
(Gleick, World Bank).  Irrigated area is expected to continue to expand in order to meet 
  12the food demand of a growing population (FAO), but fresh water resources available for 
irrigation will at best remain fixed and most likely decline, stressing the need for 
improved efficiently of irrigation water.   
There are ways to increase agricultural output without reliance on fresh water 
sources, such as improved crop variety (genetically or conventionally modified), 
appropriate water pricing and increased use of marginal sources (reclaimed, saline water).  
In this work we focus on conjunctive management of ground and surface water.  We note 
that crop production is affected not only by the quantity of water input but also by how 
this quantity is distributed within and between growing seasons.  Owing to the random 
nature of precipitations, surface water supplies typically fluctuate randomly while 
groundwater sources are relatively more stable.  The latter, thus, can be used to stabilize 
the supply of irrigation water, thereby increasing output over and above that expected due 
the increase in the average quantity of water input.  
Applying the analysis to the Coimbatore district in Tamil Nadu, India, we found 
that the stabilization value of groundwater exceeds 25% of the total value of 
groundwater.  Ignoring the stabilization value (by assuming that surface water is stable at 
the mean) leads to undervaluing groundwater by more than 25%.  Put differently, under 
the prevailing rainfall variability, conjunctive management of ground and surface water 
in this region can increase water use efficiency by more than 25%.  Groundwater 
resources are prevalent worldide, yet often mismanaged due to their common property 
feature.  This is particularly true for the region studied here (Palanisami).  Understanding 
the true value of groundwater is a necessary step towards a better management of this 
resource.  
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X(z)=S+g  Sce 
 
Figure 1: Rainfall is distributed between Smin and Smax with mean Sm=E{S}.  The 
derived demand for irrigation water is the value of marginal water productivity 
R'(x).  Areas underneath the derived demand curve represent revenues.  z is the 
unit cost of groundwater.  The total revenue is the area AExzO and the average 
groundwater cost is E{z(x(z)-S)}=z(x(z)-Sm) = area GEx(z)Sm.  The average profit 
is the area AEGSmO.  The total value of groundwater is the area HEGSmSce, of 
which SV = area HCSmSce and AV = area CEG. 
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Figure 2: Annual rainfall (mm) in the Coimbatore District during 1965−1985 
and 1991−1999. 














Figure 3: Value of marginal water productivity (Rs m
-3) in Coimbatore Water 
District.  
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Table 1: Planted area, water requirement, yield and price ($1=48.5 Rs in 2002) 












Cotton  8576 6000  2.91  8576 
Cholam  6451 3500  0.90  6451 
Groundnuts  15145 4500  1.39  15145 
Sugarcane  12355 20000  6.49  12355 
Chilies  2594 5000 21.76 2594 
Tomato  5827 5000.00 13.94  5827 
Paddy rice  12258 12500  2.26  12258 
Tapioca  1214 6000 32.04 1214 
Ragi  80 3500  148.58  80 
Turmeric  2910 14000 37.41  2910 
Banana  7561 20000 17.99  7561 
Soya Beans  35 5000  537.77  35 
Onion  2537 3000 45.29 2537 
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Cotton  510  778  1730 884 1577 4675 376  1159  1889  1179  14757 
Cholam  206 363  661  157  567  562  406 373 212  0  3507 
Ground 
nuts 
3028  767  1328 262 1521 2602 664  638  1006  228  12044 
Sugar 
cane 
6224 1206  2649  357  14096  7029  651  5238 4585  581  42616 
Chilies  705  1903  2730  800  4000 12423 696  2707  4799  1578  32341 
Tomato  173  1750  2669 1086 1717 3586 736  633  1813  824  14987 
Paddy 
rice 
956  1310  1662 282 2503 3582 933  1746  2394  1440  16808 
Tapioca  353  1250  4439 1050 4067 4212 240  2783  2281 40  20715 
Ragi  136 683 2152  490  974  2458  568 768 1046  20  9295 
Turmeric  9206  2095  2702 367 5888 4690 816  725  2686  607  29782 





765 276  892  723  698  1365  441 712 1038  217  7127 
Onion  7549 3212  5442  769  5497  8578  1319 3794 3783  2985  42928 
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Table 3: Groundwater values (except for last row, all values are in Rs). 
Symbol Description  Result 
R(Sm)  Revenue at the mean  2,395,063,341 
E{R(S)} Mean  revenue  2,342,143,999 
SV= R(Sm)− E{R(S)}  Stabilization Value  52,919,342 
R(∞)=  Revenue under unlimited water  2,552,096,009 
A= R(∞)−R(Sm)  Upper bound on Augmentation 
Value AV 
157,032,667 
A + SV  Upper bound on the total value 
of groundwater 
209,952,009 
SV/(A+SV)  Lower bound on share of SV in 
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